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Abstract 
Attribute-based access control (ABAC) is a very powerful and flexible secu
technique making it possible to overcome limitations of traditional role-based and 
discretionary access controls. ABAC enables the dynamic handling o
numbers of heterogeneous and changing resources and users, a task especially
relevant for E-Commerce or distributed computing. With an authentication a
authorisation infrastructure (AAI) in place, service providers could benefit fro
synergies and outsourcing possibilities and, simultaneously, strengthening the
security level. In addition, AAIs could arbitrate between users’ privacy issues and 
vendors’ information demands, using privacy enhancing technologies. However
implementing ABAC is not trivial; nor is the derivation of attributes or metadata
This work proposes a solution to the demands for privacy aware, usable, secure,
and outsourceable E-Commerce infrastructures with an AAI / ABAC combination. 
We introduce relevant technologies and an implementation that is evaluated. The 
prototype is based on the Liberty Alliance’s ID-FF system, using 
elements and classification tools. 
rity 
f vast 
 
nd 
m 
ir 
, 
. 
 
XACML 
ures & 
 
Keywords: IT Security, e-business Models, e-business Architect
Technologies, Authentication, Security Protocols, Access Control, Privacy 
 
0BIntroduction and motivation 
1 Introduction and motivation 
In the changing environment of E-Commerce and distributed computing 
demands on infrastructures and service providing have developed. For Servic
Providers (SPs) these demands include a higher level of security through f
grained access control and additional information about customers an
reputation as well as the possibility to outsource security services to 3rd p
providers. Users require better usability with a Single Sign-On (SSO), cen
maintenance of account data, and the possibility to prove reputat
trustworthiness from one provider to another. Privacy protection has also become 
a major concern. Traditional techniques and methods can not satisfy 
demands. 
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Of course, this list of user and provider demands is not complete. For an in depth 
discussion of E-Commerce stakeholder’s demands see (Schläger et al. 200
and (Schläger, Pernul 2005).  
1.1 Service and security infrastructures for E-Commerc
environments 
At the dawn of E-Commerce only few providers offered services on the internet
Each vendor developed and maintained its own proprietary software solution as
an isolated application. The main challenge then was to translate traditional brick-
and-mortar business to the internet. Today E-Commerce has become ubiquitous. 
One user is related to many vendors and maintains numerous accounts 
identities, each containing user profile data. The challenge has shifted from mere 
technical problems to convincing product offerings and diversified services
order to provide added value to customers in highly competitive markets. T
Internet serves as a new platform for business transactions. Securing t
transactions is crucial for E-Commerce providers (Katsikas et al. 2005). 
Generally, we see contradictory requirements on E-Commerce servicin
depicted in Figure 1. A suitable infrastructure for modern E-Commerce providing
needs to mediate between users and providers and offer sophisticated securi
and federation services.  
 
 
Figure 1: User and provider demands 
 
E-commerce vendors can rely on infrastructures supporting their bu
processes. This can be extremely relevant for small and med
companies not having the resources or the knowledge to secure their business or 
to maintain data storage facilities for sophisticated customer rela
management. In addition, these providers will especially benefit from synergie
resulting from a larger customer and information base in a 
Infrastructures could empower such a federation with complex, yet transparent to 
use, technology improving e-business models, processes, and security fo
Commerce providers. 
siness 
ium-sized 
tionship 
s 
federation. 
r E-
 2 
References 
1.2 Authentication and authorisation infrastructures (AAIs) 
Known authorisation models for Access Control (AC) include discretionary (DAC), 
mandatory (MAC), and role based access control (RBAC). A discretionary model
is not flexible enough for the changing portfolios and customer tailored resources 
or products offered in E-Commerce environments. The mandatory AC model 
favourable for military purposes concentrating on information flow control making
it inadequate for commercial purposes. Nowadays, RBAC is state-of-the-art fo
business products. However, Internet and E-Commerce environments lac
needed stable role structure. A permanent structure would be against the nature
of the ever-changing Web.  
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Attribute-based access control (ABAC) is one of the latest developments in th
field of authorisation and access control. With XACML – the eXtensible Acces
Control Markup Language (OASIS eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
Technical Committee 2005) – an open standard has been proposed b
OASIS (Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards
that is able to express policies based on classical access control models like role-
based and discretionary access control (Priebe et al. 2004). XACML ena
building complex policies that derive an access control decision from object and
subject attributes. This standard facilitates providing dynamic, flexible, and fine
grained access control. An important standard for the exchange of se
information between service and identity providers is SAML – the S
Assertion Markup Language (OASIS Security Services Technical Commi
2005) – also maintained by the OASIS group. 
Service providers on the Internet are familiar with infrastructures providing basic
security services. Authentication and Authorisation Infrastructures (AAIs) ha
started with basic Single Sign-On functionality and are nowadays able to manage 
the authorisation process and access control decisions. Two main architecture
can be found: central ones like PAPI (Castro-Rojo, López 2001) or Microso
.NET Passport solution (Microsoft Inc. 2003) or federated ones like Libe
Identity Federation Framework (Liberty ID-FF) (Cantor, Kemp 2005) or Internet2’s 
Shibboleth (Cantor 2004). 
AAIs help sharing security information about subjects and objects with other SPs
or central services. Such information could be an assertion about the u
correct identification and authentication. Additionally, trusted sources can provide 
profile information. Using these attributes an access control model like AB
(e.g., using XACML) can decide on the user’s rights. Figure 2 shows the process
of granting access to resources with the help of user, environment, and resource
attributes. 
 
 
Figure 2: Attribute infrastructure security services 
 3
1BRelated work and relevant technologies 
 
Attributes can contain identity and profile information. Despite this information’
usefulness for access control, the user’s privacy needs to be respected as wel
To mediate between providers’ wishes and users’ demands trusted parties a
needed, filtering or aggregating attributes. Aggregation or classifica
attributes is a recognised privacy enhancing technology (PET) (Federrath 2005),
additionally providing efficient ways to exchange data. 
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1.3 Enabling E-Commerce with attribute-based acc
control and AAIs 
This work presents a combination of Authorisation and Authentication
Infrastructures with attribute-based access control and privacy enh
technologies. We suggest a new protocol and architecture to address the give
problems. A prototype has been implemented, making it possible to evaluate the
proposal.  
Although AAIs are per se generic architectures, the term E-C
throughout the paper is used meaning business-to-consumer transactions (B2C
E-Commerce). When talking about users a client e.g. a private custom
meant. The term Service Provider refers to vendors.  
 
2 Related work and relevant technologies 
AAIs make it possible to combine service outsourcing stra
strengthened security. A special benefit lies in the accumulated user data over a
federation: user profiles, buying patterns, and earned privileges. Identities can be 
transferred from one service provider to another making it possible to always use 
up-to-date address data or proof a good reputation acquired at one federat
member. Comparative surveys on existing AAIs can be found in (Lopez et
2004) and (Schläger, Pernul 2005). Pfitzmann (Pfitzmann 2003) has analys
privacy issues in the Liberty ID-FF protocol and prese
enhancements. The idea of outsourcing non-functional tasks has been discussed 
in the field of software engineering (see e.g. Tanenbaum, Steen 2002).  
(Katsikas et al. 2005) sum up requirements in providing secure E-Commer
The shown need for flexible and dynamic access control in E-Commerce can be
addressed with ABAC as presented in (Priebe et al. 2006) or (Yuan, Tong 2005).
The basic idea is not to define permissions directly between subjects and objects, 
but instead to use their attributes as the basis for authorisations. For subjec
attributes can be static or dynamic. Age, current location or an 
subscription for a digital library could be used as well.  
Subjects and objects are both represented by a set of attributes and re
attribute values. Permissions are defined between subject and object descriptors
which consist of sets of attributes, conditions, and an operation that is t
executed. Environment attributes like time of day can be considered fo
access control decision as well (Priebe et al. 2006). 
Several techniques have already been mentioned in the cau
introduction. To enable attribute-based access control the open standard XACML 
2.0 (OASIS eXtensible Access Control Markup Language Technical Committe
2005) can be used. XACML has been applied with great s
implementations of ABAC. As XACML is agnostic to the exchange of attribute
an adequate approach is needed. With SAML an open standard exists providing
an XML-based protocol to transfer attributes (OASIS Security Services Technical 
Committee 2005). The integration of SAML with XACML has been proposed b
(Anderson, Lockhart 2005).  
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2.1 SAML 
SAML is an XML-based standard to describe security information wh
communicated between system entities and domains. It defines the syntax
assertions about a subject and the processing semantics of these assertio
There are three different kinds of information which can be communicated wi
SAML: Authentication information, attribute information, and author
information. It can be used to provide requested assertions, auth
subjects, and return the resulting assertion and perform a complete Single Sign
On and single logout process. In the assertion and the protocol definition 
extension points declared to integrate additional functionality which is not covered 
by the SAML standard. 
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2.2 XACML 
XACML is an XML-based standard to describe attribute-based authorisation rules 
and policies. Furthermore, it specifies rules to process and combine 
authorisation rules and policies. XACML enables authorisation processes w
fine granularity. XACML is based on rules which can be specified w
element <Rule>. A <Rule> has an attribute Effect. The value of Effect can b
“Permit” or “Deny”. Rules can be aggregated to policies and policies to polic
sets.  
A policy is defined with the element <Policy>. A rule-combining algo
specifies how to evaluate several rules and how to treat different effects of rules
in one policy. The resulting granularity and flexibility make XACML espec
useful in changing, flexible, and heterogeneous environments.  
A policy enforcement point (PEP) is the interface between resource and subject
It performs the access control for the resource. If the access requester (the 
subject) wants to access the resource the PEP forwards this request to the policy 
decision point. The request can contain additional attributes for subject, resource, 
kind of access and environment. The Policy Decision Point (PDP) computes the
decision whether the subject gets access or not. For that purpose it requ
additional attributes from the policy information point (PIP). The PIP retrie
these attributes and passes them back to the PDP. Now the PDP evaluates th
policies and policy sets it got from the policy administration point (PAP) when
was initialised and sends the response to the PEP. The PEP permits or denie
access for the subject to the resource depending on the response. Additionally it
processes the actions stated in the <obligation> element of <Rul
<Policy>. As the XACML standard does not consider distributed environments
or scattered attribute bases, it needs adaptation for AAIs.  
2.3 Resulting technical requirements for AAIs 
Based on the mentioned SAML and XACML functionalities and entit
appropriate AAI needs to support four steps or sub-services. Figure 3 shows their 
interaction.  
 
 
Figure 3: SAML/XACML services for ABAC in AAIs 
 
In the easiest case the infrastructure provides only Single Sign-On. This would be 
done by giving out an assertion about correct authentication on a subject. 
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Combining this step with the next sub-service the AAI covers the transf
attributes about users and resources. This could be implemented as interface
which allow a resource to query a user’s home domain about his or her attributes 
using SAML. Even more powerful are AAIs which can even come to a decisio
regarding a user’s access request and then forward this decision to the resource. 
Finally, with the fourth and last sub-service, it is possible that the AAI enforc
the decision by itself by installing a proxy system in between the client and th
resource. 
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2.4 Lessons from existing AAIs 
Various AAIs are available on the market, accessible as frameworks, products, or 
mere concepts. Among evaluated systems were Microsoft’s .NET Passport, th
Identity Federation and Web Service Frameworks from Liberty 
Internet2’s Shibboleth, the Spanish PAPI system, the privilege managem
infrastructures (PMIs) PERMIS and AKENTI, as well as Grid AAIs like CARDEA,
CAS, GridShib, and VOMS. The detailed analysis can be found in (Lopez et a
2004), (Schläger, Pernul 2005), and (Schläger et al. 2006). All solutions have 
SSO functionality in common. However, neither of them is able to provide ABAC.
At most, attribute exchange is supported. The implementation of SAML wit
Liberty’s ID-FF and Shibboleth is exemplary for an open AAI. Grid systems an
PMIs have developed means to compute an access control decision fo
enquiring service. An enforcement of this AC decision is only realised by PAP
PAPI resembles a proxy system covering the whole communication pro
between client and vendor. From an architectural point of view the adversarie
.NET Passport and Liberty’s ID-FF show the extremes of a centralised versus 
federated infrastructure. When delegating security services to an A
decision has to be taken for each module whether to centralise this service
provide it in a distributed manner. For more information on the consequences o
allocation issues in AAIs and the resulting impact on functionalities and privac
see (Schläger, Ganslmayer 2007).  
2.5 Privacy enhancing technologies 
A common definition of privacy has been given by Alan Westin (Westin 196
“Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determ
themselves when, how, and to what extent information abou
communicated to others.” When talking about privacy on the Internet, we usually
mean informational privacy, which can be defined as “Self-determination of what
information is known about a person and how it is used” (Schläger, Pernul 2005).  
In (Federrath 2005) Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET) are presented that try 
to guarantee confidentiality when using Internet-based communication. They can 
be defined as technologies minimising or avoiding personal data as we
safeguarding lawful processing of data. PETs aim at hiding the user’s ident
making his actions unobservable to others and try to provide an unlinkability 
user actions. They explicitly do not trust network operators or a single centralised 
station. From the privacy demands we have deducted three main functionalitie
for our ABAC enabled AAIs.  
- First of all identity and privileges need to be separated.  
- Secondly, data gained in the process of access needs to be store
distributed manner. Involved parties should use and gain as little informatio
as possible.  
- Finally, the user mustn’t be forced to trust a predefined identity provider b
should rather be able to choose among various providers the one of his liking. 
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3 Design goals for ABAC-enabled AAIs 
This works proposed a new AAI concept integrating functionalities of A
based on open standards, mediating between user and provider demands in E
Commerce environments. We have shown that ABAC is preferable to other A
models for this scenario. With XACML we try to add ABAC functionalities to AAIs
using an open and approved standard. Open issues with XACML for distribute
usage have to be solved. The question of attribute information origin and privacy
will be addressed with PETs. The following paragraphs summarise findings of the 
analysis of open standards, PETs, and existing AAIs and formulate design goals
for the proposed architecture in section 
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3.1 Elements of XACML and SAML 
PEP – Policy Enforcement Point. Naturally, the PEP is closely connected with the 
SP. It is at this point where the final access control functionality takes place. The
PEP could be realised as a proxy between user and vendor. Howeve
resulting bottleneck and the restrictions of a generic solution argue again
centralised approach. Furthermore, enforcing security decision outside the target
application neglects inherent information about the application. For fine-graine
access control the application’s context must be incorporated.  
PDP – Policy Decision Point. For the PDP the benefits of maintain
decision process centrally have to be evaluated versus being a single-point-
failure. We argue that for a given number of PEPs we need one
guarantee performance and still use the benefits of maintaining it cen
Following the arguments given in the introduction a local PDP is neither use
from a software engineering nor from an economical point of view. 
PIP – Policy Information Point. The Policy Information Point gathers all relevan
attributes for subjects, objects, and the environment. It is possible to assig
PDP one or more PIPs. The PIP communicates with the relevant a
authorities collecting attributes that are then forwarded to the PDP. We se
need to integrate at least two PIPs into an access control decision. The P
should make use of his own PIP collecting resource and environmental attributes. 
Another PIP is needed to perform the categorisation of user attributes.
needs to be done by a trusted authority. In our approach we have decided on the 
IdP to accumulate and categorise user data. 
PAP – Policy Administration Point. In order to realise multi-lay
architecture merging centrally stored high level policies with locally maintaine
low level policies the PAP needs to be able to derive policies from all ser
providers. The combined policies are loaded by the PDP at start-up. Centra
maintained PDPs should each have their own PAP.  
SAML – SAML Assertions are responsible for the users’ SSO. As an
standard it is predetermined to form the underlying communication technology for 
every open AAI approach. Its potential to sign, encrypt, and communicate a
kind of attributes builds the basis for XACML decisions.  
3.2 Attribute infrastructure 
XACML distinguishes three classes of attributes: subject attributes (user), objec
attributes (resource), and environmental attributes. In our infrastructur
subject attributes are collected by the chosen IdP. Resource attributes
general environmental attributes are managed by the PDP’s PIP. Wit
separation the SP is protected from revealing resource information to 
members or competitors and the user can chose his most trusted IdP. The SP is
supposed to use opaque and changing IDs for his products. The proce
accumulating user attributes by the IdP is shown in Figure 4 using SAML/XACML 
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nomenclature. The IdP queries each SP if attributes about the identified user are
available (step 1). If applicable the SP answers with a token (step 2).  
 
 
 
Figure 4: Collecting distributed attributes in a federation 
 
The IdP uses the user’s implicit profile information to complement the explici
given account data. The request for a policy decision <AuthzDecisionQuery>
(step 3) is send to the PDP which will request all three kinds of attributes from the 
IdP’s PIP as well as from his own PIP managing resource and environme
attributes (steps marked with 4). After the decision is computed, it is send back to 
the requestor - the IdP (step 5). 
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3.3 Enhancing ABAC with attribute categorization 
Data stored about the user can be classified in three levels, shown in Figure 5. A
pseudonym is used as an identifier or Distinguished Name (DN). Adding to th
pseudonym personal data like email address, true name, or shipping address 
user can be associated with his true identity, regardless of the chosen DN. Thi
data is given explicitly by the user and needs to be maintained. Even 
information about the user is stored in his profile. The profile combines
explicitly given account data, and derived information from the users shoppi
patterns, payment history, or behaviour. This information can b
reputation. Please note, that in an open scenario, like E-Commerce, the notion of 
bad reputation is not feasible. Users behaving intentionally untrustworthy will not
let this information be exchanged between SPs. They might simply apply for
new account.  
In section 2.5 we have argued for distributed storage, data canniness, and use
privacy. By nature, the idea of computing access control decisions based
attributes that contain user patterns and behaviour, reputation, an
personal profile data is in contrast with privacy issues. For our architecture 
have implemented a distributed decision making process splitting and dividi
information over different parties. Only in the unlikely case that the whole system
and all members are compromised the users’ complete profile informatio
accessible. Furthermore, user profile data is filtered.  
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Figure 5: Attribute classes in AAIs and their Expressiveness 
 
Although explicit user data is available through Customer Re
Management (CRM) systems, it is sufficient to communicate relevant information
only. A summary of different approaches to share trust and reputation
Commerce environments can be found in (Jøsang et al. 2005). For the prototype
we adapted a simple trust management solution: We categorise bu
transactions into five different classes. We assume the members of a federation
have agreed on general and binding processes to derive these classes from their 
CRM system. The categorisation is given in 
lationship 
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Table 1. 
Exchanging user classifications rather then exhaustive buying patterns is a
reasonable from a performance point of view. Furthermore, the classification 
data enables SPs to define access policies much easier.  
 
Table 1: Proposed user categories for reputation sharing 
Category Origin Effect 
Null No data or insufficient data about the user
categorization is possible. 
, no  
Standard Data about the user is stored and was processed;
no categorization for a special reputati
privileges could be made or the user opted against 
it. 
 
on or 
er 
no 
The attribute issu
would grant 
additional privileges. 
Bronze Recent business transactions hav
completed satisfyingly over all. 
e been The issuer would grant 
minor privileges. 
Silver Business transactions have been comp
satisfyingly over a longer period of time. 
leted The issuer would grant 
some privileges. 
Gold All recorded business transactions have b
completed satisfyingly. The data stems from
longer period of time and from n
transactions. 
een 
 a 
umerous 
The issuer would grant 
full privileges. 
 
With the proposed classification the PDP can evaluate the AC decision based on
user attributes from his account (especially age, origin, and roles are importa
e.g. to comply with local legal regulations), his reputation status in the federation, 
environmental attributes from the accessed SP, and attributes describing 
resource. Note that we have succeeded in separating subject and
identities from privileges to compute this decision. The PDP is not aware w
accesses what.  
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4 Proposed protocol and implementation 
For our prototype we made use of the main elements of Liberty ID-F
namely distributed identity and service providers, and used SAML 1.0. The fir
step of the access control decision – the authentication – is handled as define
by the Liberty ID-FF protocol. In addition to these parties we introdu
XACML elements PIP, PAP, PDP, PEP, and a classification t
categoriser. As the XACML standard is very imprecise about the PIP we decided
on using the PIP concept mainly as an interface on relevant databases and a as
transformation tool of information and attributes into SAML. The or
proposed Context Handler has been substituted by this functionality. 
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Figure
shows our ABAC-enabled AAI in a sequence diagram. The gr
accordance with the UML 2.0 notation using SAML and XACML nomenclatur
On top of the sequence we have included the information gained by the involved
parties about the transaction in the process. Note that this process is gene
The requested resource can be any good, digital, or Grid computing service.  
 
 
Figure 6: ABAC-enabled AAI prototype – sequence diagram 
 
When the user tries to access a resource he is referred to his IdP. The Id
derived either from a cookie stored in the user’s browser or the user choo
from a list. This is the standard Liberty ID-FF SSO procedure. The SP (SP-1 
P is 
ses 
in 
st>. 
s 
groups 
e 
Figure 6) sends the IdP a SAML authentication request <AuthnReque
Additionally, he sends an XACML authorisation decision request, forwarding with 
it his identifier, a random, opaque user identifier, and a random, opaque resource 
identifier.  
After the user is authenticated at his IdP the XACML component of the IdP – it
PIP – collects all user profile attributes. Every SP in the federation is asked about 
user attributes. These attributes will be classified in one of the five 
according to Table 1. After the PIP has collected all attributes (respectively th
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categorisations) their weighted value is calculated into one category. For 
prototype this is just the average of all attributes. However, it is feasible to weight 
stronger classifications that have been derived over a longer period of time
consist of more business transactions. Adding account data to the classificatio
the IdP can now send an AC decision request to the PDP with the identifier of the 
requested resource and all relevant user attributes. The PDP’s PIP will coll
resource and environment attributes. It is important that the SP’s environment is
used. For example for special offers with a specific deadline the time zone of the
SP needs to be used. The time zone might be differing from the PDP’s serv
The AC decision is computed using the loaded policies. For our prototype simple
policies have been generated to prove our concept. However, it is possible to use 
fine grained access control policies. The decision is send back to the requesting
entity – the IdP. The SAML authentication statement and th
authorisation decision statement are referred back to the SP using the s
communication channel as before. Although, Web Services could be used via the 
Liberty WSF we stay with Http Post requests at this stage. Such increme
developments will be applied in the next circle of enhancements. Finally, a loca
PEP at the SP will enforce the decision.  
our 
 or 
n 
ect 
 
 
er. 
 
 
e XACML 
ame 
ntal 
l 
 this 
) he 
e 
lity 
 
 the 
he 
 the 
e 
nal 
 
 
 the 
he 
 reference 
 is 
 
s also 
per 
 
s. 
enhancing 
After the access request is terminated we find various data objects from
transaction at the various parties. Starting with the SP in question (SP-1
knows what has been accessed in this transaction and the used attributes. H
was asked by the IdP to provide the user classification. However, as in rea
multiple requests will be made he should not be able to connect user identity and 
resource request. The only data he knows about the user is data already existing 
in his CRM. The brackets in Figure 6 symbolise this peculiarity. Naturally, the SP
also knows about the outcome of the decision. Please note that, through
usage of opaque IDs, he gains no information about the user’s identity via t
SAML Authentication Assertion. 
All other service providers know that a user has requested a resource in
federation. However, no further data is generated with the request.  
The IdP knows who accesses a resource and his account data. Furthermore h
gets informed about his classification or categorisation at the federation members 
and the outcome of the decision. We strongly recommend that a user can choose 
between various providers finding the one he trusts most due to the perso
information aggregated at this point. Despite this recommendation our prototype
right now features only one IdP. The policy decision point computes his decision
only based upon the subject and object attributes. He is neither aware of
identity of the requestor nor of the product in question. Naturally he knows t
decision.  
For the implementation the SSO functionality of Liberty’s ID-FF was used. For the 
XACML components we have started with SUN’s XACML
implementation changing and adopting where necessary. The classification
based on a simple Java-based computation. The classification will be developed
to a rule-based service in the future. The existing implementation ha
pointed to various issues of compatibility.  
 
5 Conclusion  
ABAC and AAIs are able to provide security services well suited for E-Commerce 
if combined logically and fostered on the appropriate technologies. The pa
examined various architectural and technological models for AAIs. In addition to
open standards, the proposed approach especially respects privacy demand
The given prototype is the consequence of the combination and adaptation of the 
open standards SAML and XACML with AAIs and privacy 
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technologies. We present – to our knowledge – for the first time a holistic solution 
for secure service providing with attribute-based access control in a se
oriented infrastructure. Our protocol successfully mediates between provider and
user demands. This is achieved through the integration of attribute infrastructures 
into AAIs to gain additional functionalities. With the introduced solution, servic
providers and especially small and midsized vendors can outsource services t
the infrastructure and gain new functionalities for their business processes.  
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From a privacy perspective, we have succeeded in separating identit
privileges by introducing a categorisation mechanism that maps privacy-critic
account data to reputation categories. The distribution of services and information 
leads to a minimum of required trust. The architecture is flexible enough to avoid
the necessity of forced trust relationships for the user. For service providers, the
proposed holistic approach to cover the entire security chain by implement
ABAC AAIs with PETs reduces threats and makes access control transparent for 
SPs. The usage of open standards and open formats avoids patchwork security
for the federation.  
The current proof-of-concept prototype will be enhanced to support SAML 2.
With this update strong communication security based on a PK
introduced. Furthermore, the communication between servers will be enhance
to use Web Service standards.  
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